(It will be noted that the phrase I have used for the title didn't work out too well for the guy who originally said it, but I have more confidence in my prescriptions here. We do this time know exactly who and what we're fighting.)
As the USA gears up at a glacial pace to do something about ISIL, Boko Haram has taken inspiration from ISIL's success of late and declared a caliphate of their own in northern Nigeria. This at first glance is alarming, (and certainly it is at the pointy end) but a closer examination of the circumstances of each shows much vulnerability for each group.
The irony of their success is that they have by acquiring property and infrastructure tied themselves down and made them easier to find and kill. Looking at the origin of these two caliphates, the essential ingredients in the constitution (making of, not document) of each is instability, diversity and incompetence.
Instability pretty much speaks for itself, as power of some sort will always fill a vacuum. Diversity was a factor as they both play on differences, mostly in religion to sow discord and divide to conquer. Incompetence is related to instability, but a competent military force can hold things together against insurgents even against a background of political instability, NATO forces in Afghanistan and French forces in Mali as recent examples.
Of possible options to salvage Nigeria, the only plausible one I see right now is a military coup. Ideal would be some sort of replacement of the current corrupt government with something else, but that's called colonialism and it's apparently a bad idea. The Nigerian Army has been starved for resources by a government (not unrealistically) afraid of letting it get too powerful. The irony of an armed takeover of much of a country which weakens its' army to prevent a military coup is not lost on me, but they may not be seeing it in that light right now.
So, the real challenge with either of these situations is not crippling the respective caliphates; that is tactically dangerous for the operators and troops, but we know how to break things. The trap is the nation-building that was tried in Afghanistan and Iraq. Northern Iraq gives us the Kurds, who are this iteration's "Northern Alliance" and if we stay in long enough to remove the existential threat to them we'll have done enough, barring some residual SOF presence to help them with flare-ups.
Nigeria is another matter. They have all of the resources (natural, financial and human) to sort this themselves so I don't see a pressing need to put our guys on the line there. It occurs to me that this is an ideal situation for mercenaries. As stated, the Nigerians have a problem which requires a military solution, but are loathe to give the military the resources necessary, thus threatening the state. Executive Outcomes isn't around anymore, but I'm sure there's someone(s) else to fill that role for the government in Abuja if the latter are willing to pay.
By Christmas the Islamic State will be a thing of the past [update 14 Oct 14: maybe not], but of course the residue will remain troublesome. Boko Haram is more complex for the simple reason that less influential (powerful) parties care enough to get involved, leaving out the attitude of the Nigerian government and Armed Forces to foreigners doing the dirty work in their country. Regardless, three weeks of professional military operations with air support and intel could bring that caliphate crashing down too. It's just a question of "who" and "when".
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