Whatever works is right.

First off there’s the flap about our guys talking to the Taliban in the first place, about which much virtual ink has been spilled. I’m a big “means justifies the end” guy, although this presupposes that your ends are well chosen. Note that I don’t say “well-intentioned”; we all know what road is paved with those!

Somebody is in a fair bit of trouble for saying this to the media in the first place, but that’s their career not mine. On a certain level I respect them for being pragmatic and working around the box, but from a realistic perspective, that’s not the sort of thing you need to tell the media about. If it works, great, but it’s always easier to beg forgiveness (after it works) than to get permission to do something off the beaten path. Enter the current flap:

KABUL–Canadian soldiers, and their civilian associates, have no business pursuing parallel peace chats with the Taliban, no matter how low-level the probing for mediation.

That was the sharp rebuke yesterday from President Hamid Karzai's chief spokesperson, in an interview with the Toronto Star.

"There is an important principle here,'' said Hamayon Hamidzada. "All efforts to negotiate with the Taliban on this should come through the Afghan government, and we have been saying this for a long time. We are willing to negotiate. The president has made this clear. But it can only happen if the Taliban are prepared to lay down their arms and respect the constitution of Afghanistan. Without this, there can be no progress. So, no, we do not encourage separate negotiations by Canada or any other NATO country.''

Diplomatic rule #1 in any situation: never embarrass your boss/the host country. Karzai’s government has had no luck talking the Talibs down, and it’s debatable how interested they are in doing so as long as NATO sticks around. That rank speculation aside, our attempting such is going behind the Afghan government’s back, which probably explains the vehemence of the MoD’s reaction when the subject first surfaced.

I won’t get into whether the idea was sound or not past to say that even if it was kept on the down-low I feel nothing significant would have been achieved. What they (Taliban) want and what we want, or even would like to see and in fact what we are fighting for, is just too far apart. This brings us back to the non-Pashtu areas of the country:

Many here worry that, in a serpentine way, Karzai is offering the Taliban leadership political legitimacy – even as Omar demands control of 10 southern provinces, withdrawal of all foreign troops and release of every Taliban prisoner.

If anything approaching that scenario were to unfold, it's fair to ask what was the point, then, of ousting the militant Islamists in the first place? What was the point of the West sacrificing treasure and blood to stiffen the spine of a nascent central government with modest democratic values?

The non-Pashtun warlords won't have it anyway, a quasi-Taliban II in Kabul.

That way lies civil war, the sequel.

[As an aside, I have some news for this TorStar reporter; this is already a civil war, the same one it was before we showed up, and likely the same one that will flare up bigger and badder whenever we leave.]

Hmm, this is all looking a bit familiar. I have in the past foreseen this logjam, as I have a capacity to occasionally learn something from history and general human nature. My proposal was to set up some sort of “Talibanistan” in the areas the Northern government couldn’t hold, thus cutting our losses and (if you chose the border wisely) allowing the Kabul government and any foreign partners an easier job.

Those “10 southern provinces” are all (mostly) Pashtun, the sea in which the Taliban swim so freely. Cutting them loose is not the ideal; that would be denying them a sanctuary, but barring hiring the entire Chinese Army to cordon and search everything from Kabul to Islamabad, the ideal solution is physically and diplomatically out of reach.

Again, it won’t happen either way. What will happen is inevitably half-assed unless perhaps guys like “General” Dostum and the old Northern Alliance crew get hold of the government. As long as we (at least) support the Afghan government the Taliban will never retake Kabul, and Kabul is the only hope for any part of Afghanistan to ever again even resemble a progressive society.

This is really an ethnic/religious/ideological conflict with roots going back centuries if not millennia, about as miserable a combination as you can find. It’s the kind of thing that only ever ends when one side so completely dominates the other that then latter will never rise again, or if you can effectively separate them.

It’s all good for a mild rant at least, but there is a lot of inertia involved in this mission despite the screaming and hair-pulling that goes on about who’s willing to do what, where, and for how long. It is obvious to me that short of a time machine to somehow stop the USSR from invading (though they didn’t do it just for kicks even then), and possibly more importantly keep Charlie Wilson and the CIA from sowing the seeds of 9/11 and Afghanistan II, there is no clear exit strategy for NATO in Afghanistan.

“Pick your fights and if need be cut your losses” would be my advice, were I in a position to give any.