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Monday 2 April 2012

Declaration of War, the Short Form

For years now (predating this blog even) I have railed against the Americans' lack of sense vis a vis National or Strategic interest. This is manifest from everything they have done in the last 20 years. I say that time period, as during the preceding 40 years you could argue that the questionable regimes they propped up or overthrew were within the overall strategic design of containing Communism. When that collapsed under the weight of it's own inefficiency the Yanks started looking around for causes to replace it.

In fact the rot started before that, at the time slightly disguised as a way to stick it to the Soviets. The lack of consideration for unintended future consequences in shipping hundreds of millions of $ worth of cash and weapons to a barely (if at all) civilized group of raiders in Central Asia was truly breathtaking, but at least it was in the context of containing the Red Menace. Replacing them with the Green one wasn't the plan of course, but...

The article in The Atlantic which I linked to addresses the lack of long-term thinking that goes into the way America (and NATO by extension) fights these days. This is certainly fair, but I think it misses the bigger picture. Instead of planning as if you'll still be there in five years, ask yourself why wherever/whatever it is would be worth, in blood and treasure, getting locked up in it for years on end.

Let's imagine that the Americans broke Afghanistan's government ten years ago, laid a beating on Bin Laden's goons and then let the locals sort each other out. The whole thing as far as we're concerned would be over by spring 2002, mission (actually!) accomplished. Instead, we're here over ten years later staring down the barrel of the whole place doing exactly what I've said we should have let it do in the first place when NATO finally pulls the plug after 12-13 years in 2014 or so.

It's not a tactical problem, it's a strategic one. The trick lies in finding places that we might be able to help, not failed basket case states that will act as nationbuilding tar pits. Afghanistan? Fucked. Kosovo? Shouldn't have gotten involved, it was another "stick-it-to-the-Slavs" exercise which should have died out when Yeltsin came in. Iraq? I think we all know how big a mistake that was by now. Libya? Sure Qaddafi was a dick, but a bit of pragmatism in our foreign policy would have been in order there in view of what has happened. That one at least I am willing to wait out a bit before passing judgement, but my crystal ball has Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (at least) making a comeback...

What you want is a basically sound country with a bad government; that's a simple fix. Note however that "simple" and "easy" are not the same word; if it was easy the people would do it them selves. My example for this is Zimbabwe, albeit fixing it would require some old-school colonial-style administration while you build them a functioning government. South Sudan is another possibility, but the grand prize is Iran.

You may have noted that whenever I mention attacking Iran, it's always the Revolutionary Guard and other bulwarks of the Islamic regime, not the country itself. We can get on just fine if we clear the decks for them to have a more reasonable crew in charge of the place. There would be nary a boot on the ground, save some operators making contact with the opposition, certainly no "ground troops".

This is how I would do things, but I don't set policy for anyone. What I can say is that whatever I did I would assume that my kids would be dealing with it after I'm gone, and pick my battles accordingly.

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