The immediate catalyst for this is the current stand-off in the Ukraine, Crimea specifically at this point, and the kaleidoscope of ideas about what should or should not be done. I have some definite ideas, and they are along the lines of, well, drawing some lines.Brzezinski's article of 3 March 14 is in the ball park, and his background is such that he's familiar with how Moscow does business, pay no attention to the President he worked for.
Obama has made a complete mockery of himself world-wide with his "Red lines" and lack of response to them being trampled, and what Putin is doing right now is in full knowledge that the US (and consequently the EU) will do nothing concrete to stop him.
The problem actually goes all the way back to the end of the Cold War and the expansion of NATO into former Warsaw pact countries. Poland, Czech Republic and the Baltic States are hostile to Russia and a natural fit to NATO updated for Russia vs USSR. Likewise Romania and Bulgaria were never part of Russia but subject to the latter's pressure, therefore good candidates.
There is a bigger question here though; what is NATO's raison d'être in a post-Cold War world? Let's start with the name: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This suggests a geographical connection and a group of like-minded countries. Those are two separate criteria; I consider Australia and New Zealand to be like-minded countries but the geographical connection isn't there. There is another concept at work too though: the Sphere of Influence.
The US had a shit-fit in 1962 about the USSR putting nukes in Cuba, immediately in America's back yard. It is instructive that the solution to that stand-off involved the US removing the equivalent (already placed) missiles from Turkey, an analogous geographical threat to the USSR. In the labour relations field this is called "Interest-based Bargaining" and it works with human nature. The hypocrisy of the USA in this case is not to be overlooked, but all's fair in love and Containment.
Containment was the strategy of The West vs. the USSR/World Communism. My off-the-cuff assessment of Containment's contribution is that it was plausible in concept but flawed in execution. What success it had was basically attritional (Vietnam and Afghanistan the most significant episodes) with eventual economic exhaustion of the USSR from trying to out-produce us in war materiel. It is widely overlooked these days, but "collapse by arms race" was the basic Reagan strategy against the "evil empire". Gorbachev formally ended the "Red Menace" of World Revolution, thus obviating the need for Containment, or so you'd think. Inertia however is Newton's First Law for a reason, and huge organizations and the mindsets behind them are as subject to it as much as any minor planet zipping around the solar system. Flash forward to 2008...
Putin called NATO/G.W. Bush's bluff in Georgia then, partly to reabsorb South Ossetia, more to serve notice that Georgia was in Russia's sphere and NATO could sod off. This isn't a Human Rights blog so I won't argue rights and wrongs in a moral sense which are subjective in any event. We don't tend to think that way since we are so certain that we are morally superior, but moral superiority doesn't protect you from jackbooted thugs, and that's the real-world issue.
What then is my real-world prescription for the Ukraine thing? Draw some lines and then put troops on them. Ukraine is a Frankenstein nation which could be simply and logically partitioned into East (Russia) and West (Europe) with the consent of most people on the ground. West Ukraine could then join NATO if that seemed the thing to do, but it's an economic basket-case with a per-capita GDP somewhere around that of Egypt so I'm not sure the EU wants it, but not my problem. Not ideal in a lot of ways, as there are resources and industry involved as well as people, but you have to pick your battles.
The talk right now on our side is economic sanctions, but that's not the language Putin is using right now so it's not certain the point will be made. This does have similarities with the Sudetenland in 1938, and the remedy is the same: military force. The Czechs could have held the Germans off with any military backing at all from France, but the iron to do so was lacking. The level of war-weariness in France at that time far exceeded anything in the US and Europe right now, but the present level of hand-wringing will be as (in)effective as that of '38.
If the US is serious, it should land some Marines in the Ukrainian controlled parts of Crimea and dare the Russians to try something. Putin is, contrary to wishful thinking in the liberal media, an entirely rational actor and is unlikely to bite off more than he can swallow. The Crimea is bite-sized right now, the rest of the East is still too big. That can change in either direction based on the response from Ukraine and Europe/the US; making Crimea too prickly to swallow or folding completely and allowing the Russians to walk uncontested into majority Russian areas of east Ukraine.
Putin doesn't want a war, but he'll absorb as many Russians outside Russia's current borders as he can without a big fight. That's Putin's strategic objective and it would do well to remember it in order to interpret his actions. He (and most Russians) doesn’t want to be like "us" and it's pretty chauvinistic to presume that they should. Seeing what blowhard self-referential pretentious busybodies “we” are these days I can't say I blame them.
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