[(LWant + LNeed + LAttitude + Probabillity of Mission Success) x National Interest] > [Risk + Expense] = Intervention
The world according to me. To sum up the general idea of the place: if History and Theory don't agree, it's not History that's wrong.
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Thursday, 26 March 2015
Who defends everything, defends nothing
[(LWant + LNeed + LAttitude + Probabillity of Mission Success) x National Interest] > [Risk + Expense] = Intervention
Tuesday, 23 September 2014
What would Nixon do?
Turkey is bracing itself for an unprecedented refugee crisis after as many as 200,000 ethnic Kurds fled across the frontier from Syria in just two days to escape a fresh advance by Islamist extremists.
Monday, 23 June 2014
Poles getting the shaft?
Poland's Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski called his country's ties with the US "worthless", a Polish news magazine says, giving excerpts of a secretly recorded conversation.
Mr Sikorski called Poland's stance towards the US "downright harmful because it creates a false sense of security", according to the new leak.
He has not denied using such language.
According to the excerpts, Mr Sikorski told former Finance Minister Jacek Rostowski that "the Polish-US alliance isn't worth anything".
Using vulgar language, he compared Polish subservience to the US to giving oral sex. He also warned that such a stance would cause "conflict with the Germans, Russians".Poland of course has centuries of experience on the shit-end of the Russian stick and will be grateful for any meaningful support against that threat. It is a sign of the dire state of US policy toward Russia (and NATO; hell. everywhere) that the Polish Foreign Minister holds this opinion, but twice-bitten, thrice shy.
I don't believe that Russia needs to be "contained", as they are no longer a threat to whatever Western Civilization is. It could be in fact argued that they are a bulwark against what it's turning into, but I won't go down that rabbit hole. Russia is a regional power with certain prerogatives and the Americans are hypocritical to treat them any other way. That said, invading your neighbours to consolidate the "volk" and/or reconstitute your Cold War-era glacis of western-border satellite states is not on, but the two things need to be kept in their lanes.
Back to the central point, the Poles are on the front line of any Russian revanchment of the USSR and history suggests (screams, really) that this needs to be taken seriously. I have talked before about having "lines" and any members of NATO are behind ours. In this context it includes former Warsaw Pact countries and SSRs (Poland, the Baltic States, Czech Republic, Roumania, Bulgaria) who are most exposed to, and painfully familiar with, anything Russia might do.
The Poles' concern is a practical one hinging more on deterrence than anything else, and it wouldn't have come up during W's time in the White House. As Mr Sikorsky notes, the current US policy/posture has virtually zero deterrence value while aggravating the Russians and Germans simultaneously. The Germans need Russian gas too badly to kick up much of a fuss about anything not on their doorstep and "demonizing" Putin and the entire country over the latest activity in Ukraine isn't useful to getting relations back on track.
There is a lack of subtlety in North American diplomacy vis a vis Russia and I admit the situation is tricky. The carrot and the stick both need to be used judiciously, and that means letting your allies KNOW that you have their back while at the same time letting the other side know (when appropriate) that there are benefits for "good" behaviour.
Russia is NOT a threat to us as world communism was. They are a regional issue, and our friends there require assurance that we take it seriously, which involves concrete action and appropriate language. It also might require a Striker Brigade moved to Poland. Canada is doing what it can (short of pulling the stops out for a war) but the US is the big dog in the ring. When your allies have lost faith in your willingness to back them up you can imagine what the opposition must think. In any event, Poland learned the value of Western promises in 1939 when action was (is?) at best too little, too late.
Thursday, 24 April 2014
Proxy confidence building
Ukraine’s military launched assaults to retake rebel-held eastern towns on Thursday in which up to five people were reported killed, a move Russian President Vladimir Putin warned would have “consequences”. …
In Slavyansk, a flashpoint east Ukrainian town held by rebels since mid-April, armoured military vehicles drove past an abandoned roadblock in flames to take up position, AFP reporters saw.
Shots were heard as a helicopter flew overhead, and the pro-Kremlin rebels ordered all civilians out of the town hall to take up defensive positions inside.
“During the clashes, up to five terrorists were eliminated,” and three checkpoints destroyed, the interior ministry said in a statement. Regional medical authorities confirmed one death and one person wounded.
Earlier Thursday, Ukrainian special forces seized back control of the town hall in the southeastern port city of Mariupol with no casualties, Interior Minister Arsen Avakov said. Separatist sources confirmed the loss of the building in the port city, whose population is 500,000.
The moral support which makes this possible is redeployment of NATO forces to Poland and the Baltic states. The Americans didn't land the entire 101st in Estonia or anything, but like in Georgia in 2008, a tripwire of NATO troops tells the Russians that the rules have changed. There were some Americans who were dismissive of the half-dozen CF-18s Canada deployed to Poland, but it's important to note two things. First and foremost, the Poles were NOT dismissive of our small contribution. Second, even six obsolescent fighter bombers (and the Americans sent more) with modern smart munitions and the determination to use them are not to be lightly dismissed.
Would Canada commit those planes and crews to a shooting war? Over Ukraine itself most likely not, but over an invasion/infringement of a NATO ally, most definitely, and that's what's important here. The Poles in particular have both the experience to know what Russia is capable of and the determination to not let it happen again, so they're the right group to reinforce. The Balts have motivation to keep the Russians out too, so they need and are getting some help.
Canada has played a leadership role in all of this, and we are putting what "money" we have where our mouth is, both with the (small) military contribution and now election monitors for the upcoming election in Ukraine. There is some evidence that even the chary Europeans see the election verification as something sufficiently unprovocative to get behind. At this point it must be obvious to everyone in NATO (looking at you, Germany) that they still need to be able to project military power, even if it's just next door or your own border, but again I await developments as do we all..
Wednesday, 9 April 2014
Vimy Ridge and the perils of a land war in Eurasia
9 April marks the anniversary of the 1917 attack by the Canadian Corps on the German position atop Vimy Ridge in France. This is held up as the battle which forged Canada as an independent nation, and that is certainly arguable. What is also arguable is whether or not it was worth it. Pierre Burton (spoiler alert) is of the opinion it was not, and the scale of the carnage makes this view compelling.
3598 soldiers of the Canadian Corps were killed and another c. 7000 wounded in a battle which was 90% over in one day, finished in three. For this reason (and that we did what the French and British armies had failed to do) Vimy should also be remembered in the hope that we can avoid it happening again.
Canada lost over 66.000 men in WWI and 45,000 in WWII, so some lessons were learnt, albeit at the expense of the Soviet soldiers who died in heaps fighting the bulk of German forces on the Eastern Front. My take-away from all of this is "stay out of Europe", and current events are reinforcing that view.
Speaking of the Eastern Front, the Russian shenanigans are in play again in Eastern Ukraine, specifically the Donetsk/Kharkov area. Hearkening back to my last post, my notional Putin Risk Matrix is looking more like Risk, the game. An exaggeration of course, but the current government building take-overs and calls for referendums in Donetsk, etc. is exactly the same play as Crimea and shows no signs that the West's stern finger-wagging is in any way a deterrent.
I've heard some vague reports of Ukraine mobilizing some forces to take out the agitators occupying those facilities, and if so it's about time. I'll not hold my breath, but it could happen. My point here is that things could get messy, and in this case no-one outside of Ukraine cares enough (proven by lack of concrete, effective action) to start a war over it being carved up. As lethal as modern warfare can be, the Vimy casualties are comparable to US losses in Iraq over an eight year period, so whatever could happen in Ukraine (militarily) won't be WW magnitude. That said, our tolerance for losses is not what it once (sort of) was so our bar for expenditure of blood is much lower.
Prediction? I'll go out on a limb based on available info and say there's another putsch in Donetsk. Again, no warranty on that opinion is expressed or implied. I will put money on no Western troops confronting the Russians over this, and hope that I'm right. That's not because I wish any ill to the Ukrainians, but because if their cause isn't worth enough for them to bleed for it, our people shouldn't either.
Monday, 17 March 2014
Peninsular Peril
Tuesday, 4 March 2014
But the cat came back...
Saturday, 9 June 2012
Risk Management and Civilization
The leftist Utopian mindset is that we should get something for nothing, whether it be services (rioting "students" in Montreal this spring) or "Green" energy. Shit ain't like that, as Newton encapsulated many moons ago. There are reactions to actions, and while these can and should be be mitigated when possible, changing anything from one state to another will have a range of effects, not all of which we want.
That is where the mitigation strategies come in because radical environmentalist cant aside, the era of rampant pollution is past. Air and water are cleaner (in the developed world) than they were 40 years ago, and it's because of improved practices and technology. This brings us to Diminishing Returns and Risk Management.
It's difficult to ascribe priority to one or the other as I can make an argument either way, but for purposes of this post I'll give Risk Management planning priority. I'll also give my own interpretation of RM which is as follows: with a particular end-state in mind (affordable energy, for example) you decide what will do more damage, the various ways of producing it or the effects of not having it.
I'm sure that's close enough for unpaid work (e.g. here) to work with, and the position of the Japanese PM re: reactors is pretty much a textbook example of risk management. With all reasonable (more on that in a bit) precautions taken, the damage to society would be far greater if the power generation is foregone than the risk presented by the possibility of accident in the production of it.
It's NOT about wringing ones' hands about the worst-case-scenario and assuming that (however unlikely it is) will be what happens. In this case, something pretty close to the worst case happened at Fukushima, and as much of a mess as it is NOBODY HAS DIED because of the radiation released from it. This is after an old (and sub-optimally designed) fission reactor was completely overwhelmed by a massive natural disaster which itself killed over 15,000 people leveled a number of small cities and actually changed the elevation of those seaside areas.
There aren't a lot of ways in which that could get worse in terms of what happened in the end result at the reactor complex itself. The Wikipedia link seems (at tme of writing) well balanced, and even the worst-case reputable estimate for lifetime cancer increase amoungst those exposed (100 cases) pales in comparison to the devastation wrought by any good-sized quake in Japan. Fukushima was rated at the same level of "devastation" as Chernobyl which is questionable at the very least from the point of view of fatalities.
Chernobyl was indeed the worst case (see link above) and I notice that the world has not ended, save for the <300 people who died as a direct result of it. Risk Management in the USSR was a very blunt instrument, leading to bad designs like the RMBK reactors. Three Mile Island marked the death knell of the American nuclear power program and NOBODY even got measurably sick from it.
The word for the reaction to all of these events is "panic". I'm not a fan of panic, but there are times when some healthy caution is in order when things go wrong. It breaks, you fix it, you carry on. You do it with your car (or bike if you're a real Green hardcase), you don't say "OMG, it broke and it could fail catastrophically, cars/bikes must be banned!"
Back to the oil spill. These have happened thousands of times in the last 100+ years and again, the world has yet to end as we know it or otherwise. I am not a fan of industrial accidents, but a certain failure rate is the price of doing anything that accomplishes anything. We take reasonable precautions, the state of "reasonable" being a moving target depending on time and perspective.
Enter Diminishing Returns. Of course if we have no rules we see all sorts of short-term gain behaviour which is why unbridled capitalism is a bad idea. That said, the "worker's paradise" of the USSR and satellite Commie states made a MUCH bigger mess of the environment than the Evil Capitalist West. At a certain point in trying to improve something you will hit that point when a further 1% improvement in x will require increasingly more effort past the diminishing returns point than what led to it.
It happens with schoolwork, it happens at work and it gets to the point where further improvement is either impossible or would be uneconomical in effort or expense. Zero-defect is what we seem to expect these days, and that 's not the way things work. The key to keeping the wheels on is to not getting bogged down striving for perfection, but to keep moving forward as best we can.
Cheap clean energy is the key to the future, and the dividing line on the global warming/climate change seems to involve the definition of what is cheap and what exactly is clean. Right now natural gas seems to split the difference with only radical anti-CO2 wingnuts having a problem with it. The supposed "environmentally friendly" sources of wind and solar are anything but, and hydrocarbon based energy will be with us for the foreseeable future. As we will also be around for the (by definition) foreseeable future, we have to do the best we can to not "shit where we eat".
The best we can do will never completely eliminate human error or materials failure. We can however keep improving things as long as we keep things in perspective and keep the people who are producing what we need honest. People aren't good at thinking rationally about stuff so we'll make a mess of it, but in the meantime we'll keep the lights on and our food coming to us by making as few errors as possible while not making it impossible for people to do the things we need them to. Mistakes will be made, but clean them up, learn the appropriate lessons and keep moving forward.
Friday, 9 September 2011
How much Bang is stopped for your Bucks?
A conventional approach to cost-effectiveness compares the costs of security measures with the benefits as tallied in lives saved and damages averted. The benefit of a security measure is a multiplicative composite of three considerations: the probability of a successful attack, the losses sustained in a successful attack, and the reduction in risk furnished by security measures. This product, the benefit, is then compared to the cost of the security measure instituted to attain the benefit. A security measure is cost-effective when the benefit of the measure outweighs the costs of providing the security measures.
Hearken back to my problems with the methods of the TSA in the last post, and we're all on the same page here. The enemy of cost effectiveness is bureaucratic empire building, and we come to where that begins in the context of American Homeland Security:
To evaluate the reduction in risk provided by security measures, we need to consider their effectiveness in foiling, deterring, disrupting, or protecting against a terrorist attack. In assessing risk reduction, it is important first to look at the effectiveness of homeland security measures that were in place before 9/11. The 9/11 Commission's report points to a number of failures, but it acknowledges as well that terrorism was already a high priority of the government before 9/11. More pointed is an observation of Michael Sheehan, former New York City deputy commissioner for counterterrorism: "The most important work in protecting our country since 9/11 has been accomplished with the capacity that was in place when the event happened, not with any of the new capability bought since 9/11. I firmly believe that those huge budget increases have not significantly contributed to our post-9/11 security."
There is another consideration. The tragic events of 9/11 massively heightened the awareness of the public to the threat of terrorism, resulting in extra vigilance that has often resulted in the arrest of terrorists or the foiling of terrorist attempts.
As the 10th anniversary of 9/11 approaches, we come back to the fact (visited a couple of posts back) that history and terrorism didn't pop out of nowhere ten years ago. I will make the argument that 9/11 was Team bin Laden's peak (safe bet at this point) and only worked because they had element of strategic surprise about the suicide bombing thing. No one will ever again allow terrorists to take over an airplane, and you'll notice they have stopped trying and merely try to destroy them in air. A cost effective solution to hijacking: lock the cockpit door and give flight attendants tasers.
With that in mind, into the meat of Mueller and Stewart's excerpt:
Putting this all together, we find that, in order for the $75 billion in enhanced expenditures on homeland security to be deemed cost-effective under our approach—which substantially biases the consideration toward finding them effective—they would have to deter, prevent, foil, or protect each year against 1,667 otherwise successful attacks of something like the one attempted in Times Square in 2010. In other words, we'd have to foil more than four major attacks every day to justify the spending.
I don't crunch numbers too much here, so I'll use theirs and take this at face value. Assuming there was this much terrorist activity in the USA (it's a big place, but seriously?) how much of it is there that wouldn't be picked off by routine law enforcement? Standard police work with some elementary triggers (chemical purchases, reports from concerned citizens, etc.) will sort most of this out, and indeed there were warnings about the 9/11 hijackers which could have been acted on.
Now the age-old question: how much is your life worth?
It is possible, of course, that any relaxation in these measures will increase the terrorism hazard, that the counterterrorism effort is the reason for the low-hazard terrorism currently present. However, in order for the terrorism risk to border on becoming "unacceptable" by established risk conventions, the number of fatalities from all forms of terrorism in the United States would have to increase 35-fold, equivalent to experiencing attacks as devastating as those on 9/11 at least once a year or 18 Oklahoma City bombings every year. Even if all the (mostly embryonic and in many cases moronic) terrorist plots exposed since 9/11 in the United States had been successfully carried out, their likely consequences would have been much lower. Indeed, as noted earlier, the number of people killed by terrorists throughout the world outside (and sometimes within) war zones both before and after 2001 generally registers at far below that number.
At the end of the day it again comes down to leadership or the lack thereof. If rational decisions are made and explained by calm, rational people to the rest of us, we will (mostly) follow that example. secure in the knowledge that our concerns are taken seriously and are being acted on. However, the Zero-Defect mentality is enforced by the media, and it takes a very strong personality to stand their ground in face of the shit-storm should something slip through, as it inevitably will.
Even with the extra multi-billions spent on all of this, things still slip through to be stopped only by alert and motivated members of the public. All that money and a Dutch tourist sitting next to the would-be bomber had to do the job; your organization was not very cost effective, was it, Ms Napolitano? Good leadership is also shown by subordinates who know when to act, but huge expensive bureaucracies don't generate many of those, and promote even fewer. Good thing the Americans can afford all of this...
Sunday, 28 August 2011
Non quia aliquid consequendum
"I want to add my body and my voice to the thousands of others who are laying themselves on the line and saying,'No, we do not want to be party to this incredibly destructive path. We're becoming more dependent on fossil fuels and now we're becoming dependent on the most dirty of the fossil fuels, which is the tarsands fuel'," Hannah said.
TransCanada's proposed Keystone XL pipeline would run from Alberta through Nebraska to refineries in Houston and Port Arthur, Texas. It would double the capacity of the existing Keystone pipeline.
Proponents say the expansion would create thousands of jobs in both Canada and the U.S. and would help reduce U.S. reliance on Middle Eastern oil. Environmental activists say the pipeline is too risky and that extracting oil from the oilsands creates far too much greenhouse gas emissions.
Last week, the U.S. State Department released a report that said the proposed pipeline would pose no major risks to the environment and would not necessarily spur further oilsands production in Alberta.
There is nothing in life without some risk (title, in classy and hopefully correct Latin thanks to Google Translate), and no, I'm not talking about getting arrested for a sit-in against something you don't like. We are indeed "dependant on fossil fuels", but this will not change by hamstringing our productivity and prosperity. I have gone over the "alternative" energy problem before, but in short Ms Hanna has no idea what is involved in keeping the modern world's lights on if she thinks that all of our energy can be produced by "solar, wind, geothermal, microhydro" and any other pie-in-the-sky "green" options.
Those listed are only good in specific locations and/or on small scale. Solar and wind farms are as much, I'd even say more, of a blight on the landscape as any (decent) pipeline and are not reliable sources of power. Geothermal only works very locally, and you can bet that any large-scale geothermal project (in, say, Yellowstone Park) would have the Green movement's useful idiots chaining themselves to drill rigs. As for microhydro, great if you have your own river, but how many people does that apply to?
Rich people can afford whatever low-efficiency power scheme tickles their fancy; the rest of us need what works, is proven to work, will continue to work or (the future) will work better than what we already have. That last one includes "scary" things like Liquid Fluoride Reactors which will do everything we need it to do, and do it more safely than existing nuclear plants or even hydrocarbon refineries. I would have one in my backyard, or at least where I could see it from there (it's still a powerplant after all) but the Greens would shit themselves at the name of it alone.In the meantime, the USA needs to get back on its' feet economically and politically, and affordable secure energy is one brick on that path. Celebrities making responsible, informed announcements/actions would help in a small way too but fat chance of that; the sensible ones seem to just keep their opinions to themselves. Cutting the size of their government by about 50% would help that immensely, but that is another post.
Wednesday, 29 December 2010
Curtain coming down on Security Theatre?
The incoming head of Germany's airport industry association has called for Israeli-style passenger profiling to be introduced. Christoph Blume said that grouping passengers into different categories of risk could put an end to the ever-growing number of security checks. Detection equipment would, he argued, "at some point... reach its technological and operating limits". But the country's justice minister said there was a risk of stigmatisation.
The harsh truth is that young Muslim males are most likely to try to take down an airliner; there has been no example that I am aware of of elderly women or toddlers making the attempt. The argument can be made that the parents could smuggle things onto the plane using the kid, but the same risk assessment applies to the parents. If they seem dangerous, their kids warrant some more attention too.
High-risk passengers - those deemed more likely to carry out terrorist or illegal activity, such as organised crime, drug trafficking or espionage - would undergo more stringent security checks. This could mean anything from a bag search to a full body search.
"This way [through profiling], control systems could be more effectively employed for the well-being of all participants," the new head of Germany's airport industry association ADV said.
Here's the key takeaway though (emphasis mine):
Joerg Handwerg, a pilot for Lufthansa and spokesperson for the German pilots' association Cockpit, told German broadcaster Deutsche Welle that current security procedures were not working and profiling was common sense. "The current controls are foolish, because we waste resources by doing things that feign security but don't actually bring security," he said. Mr Handwerg suggested a points system could be employed to determine which passengers might pose a higher security risk.I am not so optimistic to think that things will change quickly, or indeed at all, but it's nice to see some cracks in the slap-dash edifice of airline security. Still, until this calms down a bit and I can go somewhere without being treated like a criminal all of my vacations will be within driving distance.